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NOTES AND COMMENTS
BATSON v. KENTUCKY: TWO YEARS LATER
I. INTRODUCTION
Although a juror may be rejected for cause only on narrow, specific,
and legally cognizable grounds, the peremptory challenge has historically
allowed the removal of a juror by the defense or prosecution without the
removing party having to state a reason for removal and without the
removal being subject to inquiry. Though not constitutionally mandated,
the peremptory challenge is recognized as one of the most important
rights possessed by an accused.1 The peremptory challenge has also been
the subject of judicial scrutiny.
The decision in Batson v. Kentucky2 allows a defendant to establish
a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination by reference only to the
facts and circumstances of the jury selection in the case in which the
defendant is accused. Although the extent to which this decision will
effect the jury selection process has not been ascertained, the implications
of the decision undoubtedly will be significant. Some have argued that
the peremptory challenge is, in effect, crippled by the Batson decision,
but an even more convincing argument can be made that the value of the
peremptory challenge will only be diminished to the extent of its use in a
purposefully discriminatory manner.
Since the landmark case of Strauder v. West Virginia3 in 1880, the
United States Supreme Court has interpreted the equal protection clause
of the United States Constitution4 as prohibiting the state from discrimi-
nating against blacks because of their race in the context of jury selec-
tion. Strauder involved a state statute which prohibited blacks from
serving as jurors.'
Swain v. Alabama6 relied on Strauder and expressly held that the
1. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965).
2. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
3. 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
5. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 305.
6. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
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peremptory challenge was subject to equal protection scrutiny in the con-
text of petit jury selection, but the court set forth a very difficult eviden-
tiary burden. Under the Swain rule, the prosecutor's conduct was not
reviewable in any one given case but was subject to review only if the
defendant could show a pattern of systematic discrimination by the state
against members of the defendant's race in numerous cases.7 Hence, the
defendant had to overcome a nearly insurmountable obstacle to prove a
violation of the equal protection clause.8
The holding in Batson created no new rights for the defendant but,
instead, provided significantly more adequate protection of existing
rights. The decision eased the evidentiary burden for a defendant at-
tempting to establish an equal protection violation by allowing the de-
fendant to make a prima facie showing of purposeful discrimination by
pointing only to the prosecutor's discriminatory use of the peremptory
challenge in the defendant's case alone.
The Batson decision should be a valuable tool in the struggle to
eradicate racial discrimination from the jury selection process. Since
Strauder, the state has been barred from employing racially discrimina-
tory criteria in jury selection. Because the burden of proof for establish-
ing an equal protection violation under Swain was so difficult to meet,
prosecutors have been largely exempt from scrutiny into their exercise of
peremptory challenges. The Batson decision will make circumvention of
equal protection in the context of jury selection considerably more
difficult.
Although over two years have passed since Batson was decided, the
parameters and contours of the holding are still largely unresolved.
Lower courts, struggling in their efforts to implement the decision, are
reaching varied interpretations. As lower court cases come up for re-
view, the United States Supreme Court will have the opportunity to par-
ticularize some of the Batson principles that it declined to address at the
time of the decision.
7. Id. at 227.
8. Numerous commentators have criticized Swain, largely because of the tremendous burden
of proof placed upon a defendant trying to assert an equal protection violation with regard to the use
of peremptory challenges by a prosecutor. For a sampling, see Imla, Federal Jury Reformation:
Saving a Democratic Institution, 6 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 247, 268-70 (1973); Johnson, Black Innocence
and the White Jury, 83 MICH. L. Rnv. 1611 (1985); Kuhn, Jury Discrimination: The Next Phase, 41
S. CAL. L. REv. 235, 282-303 (1968); Note, Rethinking Limitations on the Peremptory Challenge, 85
COLUM. L. REv. 1357 (1985); Note, Peremptory Challenge-Systematic Exclusion of Prospective
Jurors on the Basis of Race, 39 Miss. L. J. 157 (1967); Comment, Swain v. Alabama: A Constitu-
tional Blueprint for the Perpetration of the All-White Jury, 52 VA. L. REv. 1157 (1966).
[Vol. 24:63
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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Facts
The petitioner, James Kirkland Batson, was a black man on trial,
charged with second degree burglary and receipt of stolen property.9 Af-
ter the judge had conducted voir dire examination and had excused some
jurors for cause, the prosecutor proceeded to use his peremptory chal-
lenges to remove all four blacks on the venire, resulting in a jury that was
composed entirely of white persons.' °
At that point, the defense attorney moved to discharge the jury
before it was sworn in, on the ground that the defendant's constitutional
rights had been violated." Defense counsel argued that the removal of
all blacks denied the defendant equal protection of the law under the
fourteenth amendment and denied him the right to a jury drawn from a
cross section of the community.12 The trial judge, commenting that per-
emptory challenges could be used by either party to "strike anybody they
want to," denied the defense attorney's request for a hearing on the mo-
tion.1 3 He further reasoned that the cross section requirement did not
apply to the selection of the petit jury itself, but only to the selection of
the venire from which the petit jury is selected. 4 Batson was subse-
quently convicted by the all-white jury on both counts.5
B. Lower Court Disposition and Reasoning
In his appeal to the Kentucky Supreme Court, Batson nearly aban-
doned his fourteenth amendment equal protection challenge and relied
heavily on the argument that the trial court ruling violated his sixth
amendment right to an impartial jury and to a jury drawn from a cross
section of the community. 6 The petitioner apparently thought that ar-
guing that he had suffered an equal protection violation would be of little
benefit; that argument had been made in Swain v. Alabama,'7 where the
9. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 82 (1986).
10. Id. at 82-83.
11. Id. at 83.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. Only to a limited extent did Batson argue equal protection before the Kentucky State
Supreme Court. On appeal to the Kentucky Supreme Court, Batson did contend that the prosecutor
had engaged in a "pattern" of discriminatory challenges that established a Swain equal protection
violation, while at the same time conceding that Swain foreclosed such a conclusion within the
confines of a single case. Id. at 83-84.
17. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
1988]
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Court unequivocally held that, while there are limits on the state's exer-
cise of peremptory challenges, a defendant may not establish an equal
protection violation by relying on the actions of the prosecutor in any
one particular case."8
The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the decision of the trial
court, basing its holding on Swain. 9 The Kentucky court explained that
a systematic exclusion of a group of jurors from the venire must be
shown by a defendant asserting a lack of a fair cross section.20
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, Batson abandoned
his equal protection argument altogether and relied exclusively on the
"constitutional provisions guaranteeing the defendant an impartial jury
and a jury composed of persons representing a fair cross section of the
community."2 1 Further, during oral argument of the case before the
Supreme Court, the Court inquired of the defense attorney whether he
was asking for a reconsideration of Swain and whether he was making an
equal protection claim.22 Batson replied that an equal protection claim
was not being made and that Swain need be reevaluated only if the Court
were to consider the respondent brief of the state.23
Batson also asked that the remedy fashioned by the Court, if it de-
cided in his favor, be modeled after the remedy developed in two state
court cases:24 People v. Wheeler2" and Commonwealth v. Soares.26 Both
of these cases were decided pursuant to each state's constitutional provi-
sion protecting the right to trial by a jury drawn from a representative
cross section of the community. The remedy sought by Batson would
permit exploration of a claim that the agent of the state is misusing per-
emptory challenges within a particular case. If the defendant's prima
facie case is not successfully rebutted by the prosecutor, the result is the
dismissal of the entire venire, as well as those jurors already selected.27 If
the trial court does not follow proper procedure and a defendant is con-
victed by a jury selected in an improper way, the conviction is set aside
18. Id. at 221-22.
19. Batson, 476 U.S. at 84.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 112 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). See also id. at 84 n.4; Brief for Petitioner at 5, Batson
v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (No. 84-6263).
22. Batson, 476 U.S. at 114 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
23. Id. The state asserted that fourteenth amendment equal protection values were at issue,
and not the fair cross section issue advanced by Batson. Id. at 84 n.4.
24. Brief for Petitioner at 26, Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (No. 84-6263).
25. 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978).
26. 377 Mass. 461, 387 N.E.2d 499, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979).
27. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 281-82, 583 P.2d at 765, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 906.
[Vol. 24:63
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and a new trial granted.2"
C. Issue
Despite Batson's reliance on sixth amendment analysis, 9 the Court
reexamined the evidentiary burden of Swain, a fourteenth amendment
equal protection case."0 The issue the Court considered to be before it
was whether an examination of the use of peremptory challenges in a
racially discriminatory manner is reviewable in the context of defend-
ant's own petit jury selection, under the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment.3 1
III. PRIOR CASE LAW
A. Strauder v. West Virginia
Strauder v. West Virginia,3 2 the landmark case that sought to eradi-
cate purposeful discrimination in the selection of the jury venire, was
28. Id. at 283, 583 P.2d at 766, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 907.
29. The Swain Court was direct and unequivocally clear in holding that "a defendant may not
mount a successful equal protection challenge to the prosecution's racially discriminatory use of its
peremptory challenges solely on the basis of the prosecution's acts in a single case." McCray v.
Abrams, 750 F.2d 1113, 1124 (2d Cir. 1984). However a number of courts refused to extend the
Swain holding "to immunize the use of peremptory challenges in each case from judicial scrutiny,
regardless of the constitutional provision such inquiry seeks to enforce .... The [Supreme] Court,
however, did not analyze the entire Constitution in Swain. ... Therefore, Swain does not necessarily
exempt peremptory challenges from review under the Sixth Amendment." Booker v. Jabe, 775 F.2d
762, 767 (6th Cir. 1985), vacated sub nom. Michigan v. Booker, 478 U.S. 1001, aff'd on rehearing,
801 F.2d 871 (1986), cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 910 (1987). Using such reasoning, a number of courts
distinguished Swain, which relied solely upon equal protection analysis, and have relied on either the
sixth amendment of the U.S. Constitution or state constitutional provisions to allow the defendant to
challenge the prosecutor's peremptory challenges based solely on the jury selection practices in his
case. See Booker, supra; McCray supra; People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal.
Rptr. 890 (1978); Riley v. State, 496 A.2d 997 (Del. 1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1022 (1986); State
v. Neil, 457 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1984); Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 387 N.E. 2d 499, cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979); and State v. Crespin, 94 N.M. 486, 612 P.2d 716 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980).
Clearly, no defendant has a tight to a petit jury of any particular composition. Batson, 476 U.S. at
85 (citing Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 305 (1880)). However, the courts which have
decided to permit defendants to challenge the state's use of peremptory challenges relying on evi-
dence in the defendant's case alone, pursuant to sixth amendment rights, have reasoned that the
prosecution must not discriminatorily exercise its challenges in a manner which defeats even the
possibility that the petit jury ultimately selected might represent a fair cross section of the commu-
nity. Other lower courts have interpreted Swain to mean that a defendant must prove systematic
exclusion of blacks from the petit jury in order to constitute a Constitutional violation. See United
States v. Childress, 715 F.2d 1313 (8th Cir. 1983) (en banc), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1063 (1984);
United States v. Whitfield, 715 F.2d 145 (4th Cir. 1983); United States v. Jenkins, 701 F.2d 850
(10th Cir. 1983).
30. Batson, 476 U.S. at 82.
31. Id.
32. 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
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decided more than one hundred years ago-just twelve years after ratifi-
cation of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United
States. The Strauder Court interpreted the fourteenth amendment as
granting not only citizenship and the corresponding privileges of citizen-
ship to all races, but also as denying the states the power to withhold
equal protection of the laws from any citizen. 33 Further, the decision
stated that Congress has the legislative power to protect any rights cre-
ated by the Constitution.34
Strauder involved a West Virginia law which declared "no colored
man" was eligible for grand jury or petit jury service.35 The Court found
that such a law discriminates not only by denying a citizen the right to
participate in the administration of justice as a juror, but also compels
black defendants to submit to trial before a jury from which every mem-
ber of his own race has been purposefully excluded on the basis of race
alone.36
The Court struck down the statute as unconstitutional37 and held
that racial discrimination in jury selection offends the equal protection
clause,38 a holding which has been extended in subsequent cases. While
the Court implied that a defendant has no "right to a grand or petit jury
composed in whole or in part of persons of his own race or color, ' ' 39
persons of the defendant's race or color may not be excluded from the
jury by law solely because of their color.' Further, the composition of
juries is an essential part of the protection that a trial by jury is intended
to secure.41 Since Strauder was decided, the courts have looked beyond
the statutes defining juror qualification and have ruled against discrimi-
natory implementation of facially neutral laws.42 As the Court stated in
33. Id. at 309.
34. Id. at 310.
35. Id. at 304.
36. Id. at 308-09.
37. Id. at 312.
38. Id. at 310.
39. Id. at 305.
40. Id. at 310.
41. The Court stated that "[t]he very idea of a jury is a body of men composed of the peers or
equals of the person whose rights it is selected or summoned to determine." Id. at 308.
42. See Sims v. Georgia, 389 U.S. 404, 407-08 (1967); Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 549-50
(1967); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 478-79 (1954); Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 561
(1953); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 589 (1935); Exparte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346-47 (1880).
Although most of the cases have dealt largely with racial discrimination during selection of the
venire, the peremptory challenge component of the jury selection process is also subject to the man-
dates of the equal protection clause. Batson, 476 U.S. at 88. The fourteenth amendment protects
accused persons throughout the proceedings bringing them to justice. Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400,
406 (1942).
[Vol. 24:63
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Batson, "[e]xclusion of black citizens from service as jurors constitutes a
primary example of the evil the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to
cure."
43
B. Swain v. Alabama
In Swain v. Alabama,' the Court was squarely confronted with the
issue of whether the discretionary use of the peremptory challenge was
subject to equal protection scrutiny in the context of petit jury selec-
tion." The defendant in Swain moved to strike the indictment and the
trial jury venire, and to declare the petit jury void based on invidious
discrimination in the selection of the jury." The prosecution in Swain
struck all six blacks from the petit jury with peremptory challenges. 7
While the Supreme Court refused to hold that there is a constitu-
tional requirement of inquiry into the prosecutor's reasons for the use of
peremptory challenges in any single case,48 it did place limits on the exer-
cise of peremptory challenges.4 9 The Court examined the function of the
peremptory challenge in a pluralistic society50 and found that there is a
presumption in any given case that the prosecutor is using the peremp-
tory challenge in a proper manner and that the evidence in any particular
case is not sufficient to overcome that presumption. 1
The Court did hold, however, that the systematic practice of
preventing blacks on petit jury venires from serving on the petit jury was
a different issue. 2 The peremptory system is insufficient justification for
the systematic practice of invidious discrimination.53 While the facts in
43. Batson, 476 U.S. at 85.
44. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
45. Id. at 203.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 205.
48. Id. at 222.
49. Id. at 223-24.
50. Id. at 220, 222. The Court delved into the nature of the peremptory challenge and stated
that "it is one exercised without ... being subject to the court's control." Id. at 220 (citations
omitted). "[T]he peremptory permits rejection for a real or imagined partiality that is less easily
designated or demonstrated." Id. (citing Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 70 (1887)). "It is no less
frequently exercised on grounds normally thought irrelevant to legal proceedings or official action,
namely, the race, religion, nationality, occupation or affiliations of people summoned for jury duty."
Swain, 380 U.S. at 220 (citation omitted). The challenge for cause, on the other hand, allows "rejec-
tion of jurors on a narrowly specified, provable and legally cognizable basis of partiality." Id.
51. Id. at 222.
52. Id. at 223.
53. Id.
1988]
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an individual case would not be enough to show an equal protection vio-
lation, the result would be different if the defendant could prove a sys-
tematic pattern of discrimination; therefore, the Court held that blacks
may not be "excluded from juries for reasons wholly unrelated to the
outcome of the particular case on trial."5 4 The Court further stated that
a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination might be made if the de-
fendant might show that the peremptory challenge system was being per-
verted by the systematic removal of blacks, where the removal was not
related to acceptable considerations relevant to the case being tried.55
The petitioner in Swain failed to meet the burden of production es-
tablished by the Court.56 Although the fact had been established that
there had not been a black on a jury in the defendant's county for four-
teen years, the Court said that the defendant's failure to lay the proper
predicate by showing "when, how often, and under what circumstances"
the prosecutor himself has struck the black jurors was fatal to the peti-
tioner's case. 7
IV. THE BATSON DECISION
A. Holding
The Court in Batson pointed out that, since Swain, Supreme Court
decisions have firmly established that a defendant may make a prima
facie case of purposeful racial discrimination by relying on the facts con-
cerning the selection of the venire in the defendant's own case. 8 Fur-
ther, the Court reiterated that even a single act of invidious racial
discrimination may violate the equal protection clause;59 therefore, the
Court concluded that "a defendant may establish a prima facie case of
purposeful discrimination in selection of the petit jury solely on evidence
54. Id. at 224.
55. Id. at 223. The Court said that an inference of purposeful discrimination would be raised if
it were shown that a prosecutor
in case after case, whatever the circumstances, whatever the crime and whoever the defend-
ant or the victim may be, is responsible for the removal of Negroes who have been selected
as qualified jurors by the jury commissioners and who have survived challenges for cause,
with the result that no Negroes ever serve on petit juries ....
Id.
56. Id. at 224.
57. Id. The Court reasoned that defense counsel also participate in the challenge system, and
usually play a greater role in it than does the state. Id. at 227. Therefore, the defendant must show
particularly the prosecutor's participation in the discrimination in order to establish a prima facie
case under Swain. Id.
58. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 95 (1986).
59. Id.
[V'ol. 24:63
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concerning the prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges at the de-
fendant's trial."'
Thus, the Court in Batson substantially redefined the evidentiary
burden placed on criminal defendants claiming an equal protection viola-
tion. In rejecting the evidentiary burden of Swain, the Court noted the
"crippling burden"'" that was placed on defendants pursuant to the
Swain formulation, and recognized that under Swain, peremptory chal-
lenges were "largely immune from constitutional scrutiny."62
B. Prima Facie Case
The Court announced a three-prong test for determining whether
the defendant has established a prima facie case of purposeful discrimina-
tion in the selection of the petit jury based solely on evidence concerning
the prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges at the defendant's
trial. First, the defendant must show membership in a cognizable racial
group and that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges to
remove members of the defendant's own race from the venire.63 The
Court cited Casteneda v. Partida,4 a 1977 Supreme Court case which
explained that a race or identifiable group is "one that is a recognizable,
distinct class, singled out for different treatment under the laws, as writ-
ten or as applied. ' 65
Second, the defendant may rely on the indisputable fact, that per-
emptory challenges are a part of the process of jury selection which al-
lows "those to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate. ' 66 The
very nature of the peremptory challenge is historically exemplified by the
lack of judicial control over the use of the prosecutor's peremptory chal-
lenge. Such unfettered privilege is conducive to discrimination.67
Finally, the burden remains on the defendant alleging discrimina-
tory selection practices to show that the facts and any relevant circum-
stances raise an inference that the prosecutor used peremptory challenges
to exclude veniremen from the petit jury because of their race. 68 The
60. Id. at 96.
61. Id. at 92.
62. Id. at 92-93.
63. Id. at 96.
64. 430 U.S. 482 (1977).
65. Id. at 494.
66. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96 (quoting Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562 (1953)).
67. Id. at 99.
68. Id. at 93. The Court directed lower courts to undertake "a sensitive inquiry into such
circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available." Id. (quoting Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977)).
1988]
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Court stated that "[c]ircumstantial evidence of invidious intent may in-
clude proof of disproportionate impact. ' 69 The defendant may point to a
totality of the relevant facts "[to] give[] rise to an inference of discrimi-
natory purpose."70 Discriminatory purpose on the part of the govern-
ment is what gives an equal protection violation its "invidious quality."7"
C. Trial Court Discretion
The Court pointed out that trial judges, who are experienced in su-
pervising voir dire, will be in the best position to decide if the totality of
the facts and circumstances creates a prima facie case of discrimina-
tion.72 To illustrate possible circumstances that may give rise to an infer-
ence of discrimination, the Court noted that a pattern of strikes against
black jurors might accomplish this.73 Also, the method in which the
prosecutor conducts voir dire examination and exercises challenges
might support or refute such an inference.7 4
If the defendant does make a prima facie showing, the burden is
shifted to the state to rebut it.75 The prosecutor must "come forward
with a neutral explanation" that indicates that racially neutral selection
criteria and procedures have been employed in the removal of the black
jurors.76 For the prosecutor to make a general assertion that there was
no discrimination or merely to claim good faith is not sufficient.77 If this
were sufficient to rebut a defendant's prima facie case, the equal protec-
tion clause "would be but a vain and illusory requirement. '7' The expla-
nation must relate to the particular case being tried and must be a
"'clear and reasonably specific' explanation of his 'legitimate reasons' for
exercising the challenges. '79
The trial court has the duty to determine whether the defendant has
established purposeful discrimination.80 Recognizing that the findings of
the trial court will turn largely on its evaluations of credibility, the Court
69. Id. (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976)).
70. Id. at 93-94. (citing Davis, 426 U.S. at 239-42).
71. Id. at 93. (quoting Davis, 426 U.S. at 240).
72. Id. at 97.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. The Court pointed out, however, that the explanation "need not rise to the level justify-
ing exercise of a challenge for cause." Id.
77. Id. at 98.
78. Id. (quoting Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 598 (1935)).
79. Id. at 98 n.20 (quoting Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 258
(1981)).
80. Id. at 98.
[Vol. 24:63
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instructed that reviewing courts should ordinarily give the findings of the
trial court "great deference. " sl
D. Values Served By the Decision
The Court disagreed with the state's contention that the fair trial
values served by peremptory challenges would be diminished by the new
standard.82 While the Court recognized that the peremptory challenge
occupies an important role in trial procedure, the reality of discrimina-
tion against blacks in the jury selection process necessitates judicial re-
view of their exercise." Public respect for the criminal justice system as
a whole will be heightened by enforcing the commands of equal protec-
tion and ensuring that no citizens are disqualified from serving on a jury
because of their race.84
E. Factual Application
In Batson, the Court found that the defendant had made a timely
objection to the prosecutor's removal of all blacks from the jury venire
from which his petit jury was being selected. 5 The Court remanded the
case to the trial court for a hearing to allow the defendant the opportu-
nity to establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination.86 If a
prima facie case is shown, and the prosecution does not come forward
with neutral explanations for its action, the defendant's conviction must
be reversed.
7
F. Undecided Issues
The Court explicitly refused to detail any particular procedures to
be followed by the trial court upon a defendant's timely objection to the
challenges.8 8 The Court explained that state and federal trial courts
would be in the best position to formulate specifically how the Batson
holding will be implemented.89 The Court also declined to state whether,
in a given case where there is a finding of discrimination against black
jurors, a trial court should discharge the entire venire and select a new
81. Id. at 98 n.21 (citing Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 575-76 (1985)).
82. Id. at 98-99.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 99.
85. Id. at 100.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 99.
89. Id. at 99 n.24.
1988]
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jury from a new venire panel, or should reinstate the improperly chal-
lenged jurors on the venire.9 °
A number of issues were expressly left unresolved in Batson. The
Court stated in a footnote that it expressed "no view on the merits of any
of petitioner's Sixth Amendment arguments," 91 but agreed with the
state's contention that Swain needed to be reconsidered to find a constitu-
tional violation on the record in Batson.92 Also, the Court left open the
issue of whether the Constitution places any limits on the exercise of
peremptory challenges by defense counsel.93 Additionally, the Court de-
clined to express any views on the techniques attorneys might employ
when gathering information about the prospective jurors in their eases.94
V. SUPREME COURT DECISIONS SINCE BATSON
A. Allen v. Hardy
Shortly after the Batson decision, the Supreme Court directly ad-
dressed one facet of the retroactivity issue left unresolved by Batson. In
Allen v. Hardy,95 the Court held that the Batson holding "should not be
applied retroactively on collateral review of convictions that became final
before [the Batson ruling] was announced." 96 In a footnote, the Court
added that it expressed no view on whether Batson should be applied to
cases that were pending on direct appeal at the time Batson was
decided. 97
The Court explained that retroactivity "is appropriate where a new
constitutional principle is designed to enhance the accuracy of criminal
trials." 98 While the Court stated that the discriminatory use of peremp-
tory challenges may have some bearing on the truthfinding function of a
trial, the decision served multiple ends besides the accuracy function. 99
The Court therefore concluded that the Batson rule did not have "such a
fundamental impact" on the accuracy of a trial as to compel retroactive
90. Id. at 99.
91. Id. at 84 n.4.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 89 n.12.
94. Id.
95. 478 U.S. 255 (1986).
96. Id. at 258.
97. Id. at 258 n.l.
98. Id. at 259. (quoting Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 643 (1984)).
99. Id. The Batson decision protects citizens against discrimination by the state and enhances
public confidence in the criminal justice system. Id.
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application."°
Additionally, the Court found the fact significant that prosecutors,
trial judges, and appellate courts had relied on Swain for twenty years.101
This reliance, inherent on the part of law enforcement officials, was
deemed "compelling."10' 2 Further, because of past reliance on Swain,
many prosecutors would not have kept the kind of records that would let
them explain their peremptory challenges as required by Batson, should a
defendant make a prima facie case.103 Many retrials would result, which
would be significantly hampered due to the passage of time.1 4
B. Rose v. Clark
In Rose v. Clark,105 the Court clarified the point that Batson viola-
tions are not subject to the harmless error inquiry. No matter how
strong the evidence of guilt is, a new trial may be required where the
defendant establishes a Batson violation, because the criminal justice sys-
tem protects other important values besides the accuracy of the finding of
guilt or innocence.106
C. Griffith v. Kentucky
In Griffith v. Kentucky," 7 the Court fashioned a new rule and held
that a new holding applicable to criminal prosecutions is to be applied
retroactively to all cases, state or federal, that are either pending on di-
rect review or not yet final. 108 This decision is particularly significant in
light of the Batson case, because Griffith does away with the "clear break
exception." 10 9
100. Id.
101. Id. at 260
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. Justice Marshall's dissent effectively pointed out the unpersuasiveness of the reliance
interest the majority found so significant. Id. at 264 (Marshall, J., dissenting). After all, Swain made
clear that the equal protection clause is violated when prosecutors use their peremptory challenges in
a discriminatory manner. Id. Batson merely redefines the evidentiary burden on the defendant at-
tempting to show an equal protection violation; therefore, Batson more adequately protects existing
rights, as opposed to creating new rights. Justice Marshall questioned whether the reliance interest
on the part of law enforcement officials is legitimate, if, in fact, it exists at all. Perhaps prosecutors
have been relying on the evidentiary standards of Swain to insulate themselves from scrutiny. Id.
105. 478 U.S. 570 (1986). Rose v. Clark is not a Batson-type case. However, the case uses the
Batson violation as an example of when harmless error analysis is not appropriate.
106. Id. at 587-88 (Stevens, J., concurring). See also id. at 588 n.4, which quotes from Allen v.
Hardy, 478 U.S. 255 (1986).
107. 479 U.S. 314, 107 S. Ct. 708 (1987).
108. Id. at -, 107 S. Ct. at 716.
109. Id. The Court recited several reasons for doing away with the clear break exception. The
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Under the "clear break exception," a new constitutional rule was
not given retroactive application if the new rule was a clear break with
the past and overruled a precedent of the Court. 110 The Court, in Grif-
fith, termed the decision "an explicit and substantial break with prior
precedent." ' Thus, the holding would seemingly have fit into the
"clear break exception" and would not have been given retroactive effect.
As a result of the Grifflth holding, however, Batson is to be applied retro-
actively to all convictions still pending on direct review or not yet final.
The Griffith ruling does not modify the Allen holding. In Grifflth,
the Court did not alter its prior ruling that Batson was not to be given
retroactive effect on convictions that had become final before Batson was
announced.
VI. ANALYSIS
Batson produced a radical change in the evidentiary burden that a
defendant must bear in order to establish a prima facie case of discrimi-
nation in the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges. No longer must
the defendant investigate the race of people tried in previous cases, and
correspondingly investigate those jurors selected and not selected, the
composition of the petit jury and venire, and the manner in which the
prosecutor used peremptory challenges in those cases. Under Batson, a
defendant is entitled to rely on the facts of the defendant's particular case
when claiming an equal protection violation.
Although Batson was a radical change in the law, several issues were
explicitly left undecided in the decision, and other issues were framed so
vaguely as to provide little coherent guidance for reviewing courts. The
Batson Court explicitly contemplated that the trial courts and reviewing
courts would have much discretion under the new holding, being guided
by the fairly general principles and standards announced.1 1 2 In addition
to the multitude of questions and inherent difficulties in implementing
the guiding principles specifically announced in Batson, an even larger
main reason given was that the Court found that the exception treated similarly situated defendants
unequally, with inequitable results. Id. at -, 107 S. Ct. at 715-16. For example, under the clear
break exception, the defendant whose case was chosen for review would benefit from the new consti-
tutional ruling. If, however, the decision was not to be given retroactive effect, other defendants
would be adjudicated under the old rule if their cases had been tried, but the convictions were not
final or were pending on direct review.
110. Id. at-, 107 S. Ct. at 714.
111. Id. at-, 107 S. Ct. at 715. (quoting Allen v. Hardy, 478 U.S. 255, 258 (1986)).
112. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 99 (1986).
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tension exists: whether Batson will be extended outside the equal protec-
tion analysis and further affect the peremptory challenge.
This tension is illustrated by the case of Brown v. North Carolina,"3
in which the Supreme Court denied certiorari. Although the case in-
volved a death penalty exclusion in the jury selection process, several
justices wrote concurring and dissenting opinions to the denial of certio-
rai, which shape a critical, but as yet unresolved issue.
Justice O'Connor wrote a concurring opinion in which she stated
that, at least in her opinion, Batson was decided solely on race.114 She
wrote that racial discrimination has a very special relevance in this coun-
try, and only in the "uniquely sensitive area of race" is a prosecutor en-
cumbered in the use of peremptory challenges.115 Outside the area of
race, she wrote, a prosecutor may exercise the peremptory challenge in
any way, without giving any reason." 6
Justice Brennan, in his dissenting opinion, which was joined by Jus-
tice Marshall, made the point unequivocally clear that, in his opinion,
Batson has a significance much wider than racial discrimination in viola-
tion of the equal protection clause. Instead, the significance of Batson, he
argued, is that the "broad discretion afforded prosecutors in the exercise
of peremptory challenges may not be abused to accomplish any unconsti-
tutional end.""' 7
Because the application of the racial issue was so straightforward in
the Batson case, the full significance of this aspect of the holding was
unresolved. Batson was black, and the prosecutor had struck all of the
black members of the venire. In fact, the Batson holding is replete only
with reference specifically to the rights of black defendants and black
jurors. To apply Batson only to blacks, however, would be a strange
application of the equal protection clause. As Chief Justice Burger
pointed out in his dissenting opinion in Batson, the Supreme Court has
applied equal protection principles to numerous other identifying fac-
tors." 8 The Batson majority, however, did not apply the conventional
113. 479 U.S. 940, denying cert. to State v. Brown, 345 S.E.2d 393 (N.C. 1986). The case in-
volved the issue of the disqualification of jurors based on their views concerning the death penalty.
114. Brown, 479 U.S. at 942 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 944 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
118. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, at 124 (1986) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice
Burger pointed out the following possible applications of equal protection analysis to peremptory
challenges: sex, Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); age, Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v.
Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976); religious or political affiliation, Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 748
(1983) (Stevens, J., concurring); mental capacity, City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473
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equal protection framework to the issue before it. The majority limited
the holding to cognizable racial groups and did not employ varying levels
of scrutiny based on the challenged classification.' 19 Hence, the "racial"
parameters of the Batson decision are unclear.
Assuming that the holding is limited to race but does not encompass
more than blacks, what is the burden on the defendant trying to prove
membership in a cognizable racial group? Is facial appearance sufficient?
Is an ethnic surname adequate proof?
Although much litigation has taken place in the wake of Batson, a
review of reported cases which cite Batson reveals that many of the major
"cognizable racial group" issues have not yet been considered by the
lower courts. Not enough time has passed; the lower courts either have
not yet been confronted with or have not yet addressed many of the ripe
topics regarding the unresolved issues of the confines of the equal protec-
tion claim formulated in Batson. Looking at how some lower courts have
handled Batson claims with regard to race, however, provides a picture
of varied responses.
While Justices Brennan and Marshall would probably extend Batson
principles to situations where the defendant challenges the removal of
prospective minority jurors who are not of the same race as the defend-
ant, 120 lower courts are disinclined to do so at this point. In People v.
U.S. 432 (1985); number of children, Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1971); living arrange-
ments, United States Dept. of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973); and employment in a particu-
lar industry, Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery, 449 U.S. 456 (1981), or profession, Williamson v.
Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955). Id. For a fascinating discussion of the "racial issue," see Chew v.
State, 71 Md. App. 681, 527 A.2d 332, cert granted, 311 Md. 301, 534 A.2d 369 (1987). Judge
Moylan points to recent Supreme Court decisions regarding the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and con-
cludes that when Batson is read in conjuction with these cases, the Batson decision might be limit-
less. Id. at 716, 527 A.2d at 350.
119. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96. At least one commentator had made the assumption that Batson
encompasses classifications such as females, which are outside the racial arena. This assumption is
not only unwarranted, but also relies on cases formulated under sixth amendment fair cross section
analysis and state constitutional provisions. It ignores the distinguishing fact that Batson was de-
cided pursuant to fourteenth amendment equal protection analysis. Whether the Batson protection
extends beyond race is not yet resolved. See Breck, Peremptory Strikes After Batson v. Kentucky, 74
A.B.A. J. 54, 58 (April 1, 1988).
120. Based on their opinion in Brown v. North Carolina, 479 U.S. 940 (1986) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting), the current members of the Court would probably approve of such an expansion of the
Batson holding; however, they would likely opt for such an extension under a constitutional provi-
sion other than equal protection. They would arguably rely on the "spirit" of the Batson case for
such an extension.
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Treece, 2 ' the court held that the defendant, who was white and there-
fore not a member of a cognizable minority, could not challenge the ex-
clusion of blacks from his jury. 12 2
Similarly, in People v. Zayas,123 a court relying on Batson refused to
allow a Hispanic defendant to contest the removal of blacks from his
jury. The lower court held that the defendant lacked standing and found
that the Batson holding expressly requires that the defendant show he is a
member of a cognizable racial group and that the prosecutor removed
members of the defendant's race from the jury.1 24 The Illinois Appellate
Court refused to follow a recent Colorado Supreme Court decision,
Fields v. People,'25 which held that a black defendant could challenge the
exclusion of Hispanics from his jury. The Colorado decision was pursu-
ant to the sixth amendment and the Colorado Constitution, while the
defendant in Zayas was relying on the Batson equal protection
analysis. 126
The Georgia Court of Appeals refused to allow a white defendant
who was represented by an attorney of Spanish ethnic origin to challenge
the exclusion of blacks from the jury, holding that he lacked standing.1 27
The argument that the minority status of the attorney might adversely
influence the jury was not persuasive to the court.1 2 1
Since the language of Batson expressly requires that the defendant
be a member of the allegedly excluded class, the Treece, Zayas, and Hea-
ton decisions are merely following the literal language of the holding.
Unless the Supreme Court more expansively interprets the language of
Batson, the likelihood that lower courts will ignore the commands of Bat-
son and hold to the contrary is slight. As illustrated by Fields, decisions
pursuant to state constitutions and sixth amendment analysis may yield
different results than decisions formulated under Batson.
The burden of proof the defendant must assume to prove the exist-
ence of a cognizable racial group is a predictive factor in whether the
defendant will be found to be a member of the group. For example, in
reviewing cases employing the Batson equal protection analysis, lower
121. 159 Il. App. 3d 397, 511 N.E.2d 1361 (1987).
122. Id. at 409, 511 N.E.2d at 1368.
123. 159 Il. App. 3d 554, 510 N.E.2d 1125 (1987).
124. Id. at 560, 510 N.E.2d at 1129.
125. 732 P.2d 1145 (Colo. 1987).
126. Zayas, 159 Ill. App. 3d at 559, 510 N.E.2d at 1129.
127. Heaton v. State, 180 Ga. App. 718, 719, 350 S.E.2d 480, 482 (1986).
128. Id.
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courts have found that Indians129 and Hispanics 131 may be included
under the Batson umbrella, but Italian Americans may not. This result
arguably is more owing to the standard of proof required for making a
prima facie case than to the distinguishing racial factors.
In a Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals case, United States v.
Chalan,13 an American Indian defendant successfully objected to the
removal of Indian members of the venire, and the court remanded the
case to the trial court for a Batson hearing. The opinion contained no
discussion of the factors upon which the court might have relied to con-
clude that the defendant was a member of a cognizable racial group or
how the race of the prospective jurors was determined. Also significant
is the fact that the court did not seem to question that the Batson deci-
sion would encompass American Indians as well as blacks.
The Supreme Court of Nebraska permitted defense counsel to state
on the record that both the defendant and the removed venireman were
Mexican-Americans and found this sufficient to meet the first prong of
the Batson test, where the prosecutor did not contest these allegations. 132
The court did not discuss what the defense would need to do to prove its
case had the state contested the statements. Again, the court did not
question whether the Batson holding encompassed more than blacks; the
court assumed that Batson encompassed Mexican-Americans.
When proof of membership in a cognizable racial group is limited to
the surname, the holdings vary. Thus, the Wyoming Supreme Court said
that, while the fact was undisputed that the defendant, a Mexican-Amer-
ican, was a member of a cognizable racial group, the only evidence that
tended to show that the excluded members of defendant's jury were also
of his racial group was the fact that they had Spanish surnames.133 The
court did not find this to be adequate proof.1 34 The New Mexico Court
of Appeals, however, did not require the defendant to do more than state
that the jurors with Spanish surnames were excluded. The court ac-
cepted the fact that the defendant had a Spanish surname and that the
removed jurors also had Spanish surnames and found a prima facie case
of discrimination without requiring a greater showing of cognizability.1 35
129. United States v. Chalan, 812 F.2d 1302 (10th Cir. 1987).
130. State v. Alvarado, 226 Neb. 195, 410 N.W.2d 118 (1987).
131. 812 F.2d 1302 (10th Cir. 1987).
132. Alvarado, 226 Neb. at 199-200, 410 N.W.2d at 121-22.
133. Bueno-Hernandez v. State, 724 P.2d 1132 (Wyo. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 1353 (1987).
134. Id. at 1135.
135. State v. Sandoval, 105 N.M. 696, 699, 736 P.2d 501, 504 (1987).
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However, in United States v. Sgro,136 the First Circuit Court of Ap-
peals refused to accept the defendant's conclusory allegation that he was
"Italian American" and that the government had violated the Batson
holding by striking the only two jurors with Italian surnames. The court
held that the defendant did not meet the first prong of Batson
(cognizability) and thus failed to make a prima facie case.137
Even if the defendant had established that the two jurors were Ital-
ian Americans by evidence beyond their last name, the court was not
prepared to find that the designated class "Italian Americans" met the
the test without more proof. It would have required the defendant to
demonstrate that the group Italian Americans was defined and limited by
some clearly identifiable factor, that a common thread of attitudes, ideas,
or experiences exists in the group, and that a community of interest exists
among the group's members. 38
The cases reported so far do not thoroughly analyze the Batson
cognizability requirement, either as to how expansive the term "racial
group" is or as to what must be demonstrated in any case to prove its
existence (with the exception of the First Circuit, to a limited extent).
That the results are inconsistent, though, is already clear.
In another First Circuit case, the court reaffirmed its previous hold-
ing that "young adults do not constitute a 'cognizable group' for the pur-
pose of an Equal Protection challenge to the composition of a petit
jury."'' 39 The court had made that ruling previously, but the appellant
asked that the issue be reconsidered under a Batson challenge. The First
Circuit, not surprisingly, found that the Batson holding should not be
extended to young adults."4
Finally, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that, while
blacks as a class clearly qualify under the "cognizable racial group" re-
quirement, the more restricted category of "Black males" does not.141
The defendant, relying on Batson, unsuccessfully argued that black males
were unconstitutionally excluded from his jury.142
136. 816 F.2d 30 (1st Cir. 1987), cert denied, 108 S.Ct. 1021 (1988).
137. Id. at 33.
138. Id. See Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979); Barber v. Ponte, 772 F.2d 982, 997
(1st Cir. 1985) (en banc), cert denied, 475 U.S. 1050 (1986).
139. United States v. Cresta, 825 F.2d 538, 545 (1st Cir. 1987), cert denied, 108 S. Ct. 2033
(1988).
140. Id.
141. United States v. Dennis, 804 F.2d 1208 (11th Cir. 1986), cert denied, 107 S. Ct. 1973 (1987).
142. Id. at 1209-10.
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The Supreme Court's refusal in Batson to "formulate particular pro-
cedures to be followed upon a defendant's timely objection to a prosecu-
tor's challenges" '143 has already resulted in unequitable results for both
the defendant and the state. The early Batson progeny are complicated
by the fact that the trial courts were employing the Swain standard in
cases to which ultimately Batson was retroactively applied. Conse-
quently, an adequate record of the proceedings often was not made, and,
in many cases, the reasons why the trial court overruled a defendant's
motion to quash the jury or motion for a mistrial is unclear.
Ascertaining the trial court's findings is often critical, especially in
view of the fact that the Supreme Court instructed that the findings of
the trial court are to be given great deference. When the finding of the
trial court, if any, is unclear, the deference given to the trial court may be
entirely inappropriate. This is particuarly true when the defendant is er-
roneously deprived of the opportunity to pursue a Batson claim. A sam-
pling of reported cases demonstrates this point. The following cases
merely illustrate how the implementation of Batson varies in the context
of appellate review.
In State v. Moore,1" the prosecution exercised six of its peremptory
challenges to exclude blacks, leaving only one black, who was the first to
be seated, on the jury, and a second black whom defense counsel eventu-
ally excluded. The black defendant moved for a mistrial and argued that
the prosecution had engaged in the discriminatory use of peremptory
challenges. The prosecution made a general denial of racial motivation
and noted that the first juror selected was a black male. 45
The defendant appealed the decision of the trial court not to declare
a mistrial, but the reviewing court affirmed, stating that the defendant
did not make a prima facie showing of purposeful racial discrimina-
tion. 1 46 This despite the fact that the trial occurred before Batson was
decided. The trial court, therefore, could not have employed Batson
standards.
The reviewing court, while referring to Batson, based its finding of
no prima facie case on the fact that the state had accepted two black
143. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 99 (1986).
144. 490 So. 2d 556 (La. Ct. App. 1986).
145. Id. at 558.
146. Id. The Moore court did not decide whether it would apply Batson retroactively (Griffith
had not yet been decided). Instead it held that the defendant had not made a prima facie case under
either Swain or Batson. Id.
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jurors, despite the fact it had rejected six. 47 The action of the reviewing
court is erroneous for several reasons. First, since the trial court did not
find that the defendant had failed to establish a prima facie Batson viola-
tion (as evidenced by the fact Batson had not yet been decided when trial
took place), the trial court's decision was not entitled to the great defer-
ence envisioned by the Batson court. Second, the reviewing court was in
no position to evaluate the prosecutor's reasons. In fact, there were no
reasons articulated other than a general denial, which is clearly insuffi-
cient. The only other evidence the reviewing court had before it was the
fact that the state had retained two black jurors, including the one chal-
lenged by the defense.148 The reliance of the reviewing court on the fact
that the prosecutor did not exclude all blacks is clearly misplaced. The
Batson holding makes clear that "the striking of one black juror for a
racial reason violates the Equal Protection Clause, even where other
black jurors are seated, and even when valid reasons for the striking of
some black jurors are shown." 149
Further, the reviewing court in Moore was in no position to under-
take a sensitive inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the removals,
as required by Batson. No adequate record was before it which estab-
lished what intent the prosecutor might have had in striking the blacks.
For instance, were whites that were similarly situated as the blacks also
removed?
The reviewing court should have remanded the case to the trial
court for a Batson hearing. If the defendant made a prima facie case and
the prosecutor could not provide adequate justification for dismissal of
the black members, the conviction should be reversed and a new trial
granted. If the defendant failed to make a prima facie case under Batson,
or if the prosectuor successfully rebutted such a showing if made, then
the conviction should stand. Instead, the court deprived the defendant of
the opportunity to try to make a Batson case.
A better-reasoned decision under a similar set of facts appears in
Miller v. State. I0 There, the defendant protested the prosecutor's use of
peremptory challenges in removing members of the defendant's own
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. United States v. David, 803 F.2d 1567, 1571 (1th Cir. 1986). The Eleventh Circuit was
correctly interpreting the Court's language in Batson which said, "'A single invidiously discrimina-
tory governmental act' is not 'immunized by the absence of such discrimination in the making of
other comparable decisions.'" Batson, 476 U.S. at 95 (quoting Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 n.14 (1977)).
150. 733 S.W.2d 287 (rex. Ct. App. 1987).
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race. The defendant moved for a new trial and was denied by the trial
court following a hearing on the motion.151
The reviewing court found that the hearing that had been provided
the defendant was not a Batson hearing, and the record before it did not
establish whether the trial court determined that a prima facie case was
not made, or whether it overruled the motion for another reason. There-
fore, the reviewing court remanded the case to the trial court, directing it
to make a legal determination whether the defendant established a prima
facie case of racial discrimination. 152
State v. Sandoval'53 is another case where the record was unclear as
to whether the defendant had established a prima facie case, but the rul-
ing resulted in an arguably unfair result. The Hispanic defendant ob-
jected that the state had removed the only two Hispanics from the jury.
The defendant merely referred to Batson and stated that two members
with Spanish surnames had been removed." 4 The judge asked for the
state to reply, and the state asserted that the strikes were not racially
related. At that point the judge overruled defendant's motion for a mis-
trial.1 55  The judge admittedly was not familiar with the Batson
decision. 156
While this was clearly a factual situation that should have been re-
manded for a Batson hearing, the reviewing court decided instead that
the defendant had established a prima facie case which the prosecutor
could not rebut with his general denial. Such a response will unquestion-
ably not suffice,1 57 but the facts in Sandoval clearly indicate that the trial
court had not determined that the defendant had made a prima facie
case. Despite the fact that the prosecutor replied to the court's inquiry, if
no prima facie case had been established, the prosecutor had no duty to
explain his peremptory challenge.1 58
Since the trial judge was not familiar with Batson, the conversation
was obviously not a Batson hearing. Nevertheless, the New Mexico
Court of Appeals found that the defendant had made a prima facie case
151. Id. at 289.
152. Id. at 289-90.
153. 105 N.M. 696, 736 P.2d 501 (1987).
154. Id. at 699, 736 P.2d at 504.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. The Batson decision states that "[t]he State cannot meet this burden on mere general asser-
tions that its officials did not discriminate .... " Batson, 476 U.S. at 94.
158. Once a prima facie showing is made, the state has the burden of coming forward with a
neutral explanation for its challenge of black jurors. Id. at 95.
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that the prosecutor failed to rebut.'5 9 The possibility that the prosecutor
did have sufficiently neutral reasons which he was not afforded an oppor-
tunity to furnish was real; however, the court reversed the conviction and
awarded a new trial to the defendant.' 6
0
While the possibility exists that lower courts might encounter diffi-
culties and inconsistencies implementing new Supreme Court constitu-
tional rulings, particularly those that overrule prior precedent, the lower
courts should be guided by the Batson decision and should not second
guess the trial court when findings are ambiguous. If possible, the re-
viewing court should remand the case to the trial court for a legal deter-
mination pursuant to a Batson hearing in circumstances where the
defendant has made a timely objection in a Batson situation. Reviewing
courts should avoid cutting off a Batson claim where the trial court has
not determined whether a prima facie case was made. Likewise, a re-
viewing court should not be too hasty to conclude that the prosecutor's
explanation is insufficient where the fact is not clear that the state was
made aware that the burden had shifted to it to rebut the inference of
purposeful discrimination. As trial courts become more familiar with
Batson, they will in turn make legal findings that will facilitate appellate
review.
Since the reviewing court must give great deference to the determi-
nation of the trial court as to whether the prosecutor rebutted the defend-
ant's prima facie showing,' 6 ' the Batson holding could be rendered
impotent if trial courts do not scrutinize the proffered "benign" explana-
tion with care. Once the defendant has established a prima facie case of
purposeful discrimination, the trial court must evaluate the reasons the
prosecutor articulates. The Supreme Court stated that the proffered ex-
planation must relate to the particular case being tried, and it must be a
clear and specific explanation of legitimate reasons for exercising the
challenge. '62 However, this determination is a finding of fact and is sub-
ject to review on procedural grounds only, unless the reviewing court
determines the finding of the trial court to be clearly erroneous.' 63
Lower courts differ dramatically as to what makes an explanation
sufficiently neutral to rebut a defendant's prima facie showing, and re-
viewing courts also differ as to the extent to which they will evaluate the
159. Sandoval, 105 N.M. at 700, 736 P.2d at 505.
160. Id.
161. Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n.21.
162. Id. at 98 n.20.
163. Id. at 98 n.21.
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trial court's finding. For example, in Evans v. State,'" the Georgia
Court of Appeals reviewed a trial court's determination that the state
had successfully rebutted the defendant's prima facie case, and held that
the trial court was not clearly erroneous for accepting the prosecutor's
reasons as legitimate. In Evans the state claimed to have struck three
black veniremen because they were unemployed and four others because
"they did not appear to be particularly interested in or responsive to the
selection process."'' 6 As to the former reason, there was no court dis-
cussion as to whether non-blacks had been struck due to their employ-
ment status. As for the latter, imagining a more murky explanation is
difficult. Similarly, reasons such as facial expressions and posture have
been upheld as sufficiently neutral in other cases.' 66
Explanations such as these are subject to abuse, are unpersuasive,
and are highly suspect. Subjective reasons, such as poor posture, should
not be allowed to suffice or else Batson would be crippled. Trial courts
should demand more, and the deference a reviewing court gives to the
trial court should be limited to the extent that the trial court fails to
require the kind of explanations envisioned by the Batson Court.
In a Georgia Supreme Court case, Gamble v. State,'67 the court re-
versed a trial court holding as clearly erroneous despite the fact that the
state offered multiple reasons for striking several black veniremen. For
example, the state attempted to rebut the defendant's prima facie case by
stating that it had struck one man because of low intelligence, member-
ship in the Masonic lodge, and membership in a church that was pas-
tored by a minister who was a friend of the prosecutor.' 68 As to another
black that was struck, the state claimed that he was uncooperative and
that the prosecutor could not get information from him. 69
The reviewing court evaluated the explanations in light of all the
circumstances and found them to be unconvincing. 70 For instance, the
court found the low intelligence explanation to be unfounded, especially
in light of the fact that two white jurors accepted by the prosectuion
could be just as convincingly questioned regarding their intelligence
164. 183 Ga. App. 436, 359 S.E.2d 174 (1987).
165. Id. at 440, 359 S.E.2d at 178.
166. See Chambers v. State, 724 S.W.2d 440, 442 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (The court also found
explanations of "fringe religion member," "body english," "age," "marital status," "handwriting,"
and "name association" to be sufficiently neutral.).
167. 257 Ga. 325, 357 S.E.2d 792 (1987).
168. Id. at 328, 357 S.E.2d at 795.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 329, 357 S.E.2d at 796.
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level.17 Furthermore, the court could find no reason why Masonic
membership was related to the case. With regard to the other juror who
was labelled uncooperative, the voir dire record revealed that no ques-
tions were asked of the juror. The court held that the trial court's deter-
mination that the prosecutor successfully rebutted the prima facie Batson
case was clearly erroneous.'72
The facts of Gamble illustrate a few important factors to employ in
analyzing the prosecution's rebuttal. For example, as the Georgia
Supreme Court stated, "[t]he persuasiveness of a proffered explanation
may be magnified or diminished by the persuasiveness of companion ex-
planations, and by the strength of the prima facie case."' 73 In Gamble,
the prosecution had used all its challenges to remove all blacks, so the
defendant's prima facie case was strong, although the court said it was
not so strong that it could not be rebutted. In addition, the particular
circumstances of the case being tried must be viewed in light of the of-
fered explanation, as well as the court's own knowledge of trial strategy.
The explanations articulated by the prosecution must be consistent. For
instance, rejecting a black juror is highly suspect if based on facts about
the black juror, which also apply to a similarly situated white juror who
was accepted.
Since the Batson decision gives wide discretion to the trial court,
particularized findings and statements of reason must be required when
the prosecutor attempts to rebut a prima facie case. If the Supreme
Court is eventually forced to articulate a more stringent standard for
evaluating the prosecution's neutral explanations, such a result will not
be surprising. This is particularly likely if defendants are being deprived
of their equal protection rights by faulty applications of the Batson
holding.
VII. CONCLUSION
Batson v. Kentucky radically altered the evidentiary burden for a
defendant attempting to make a prima facie case of racial discrimination
in the context of the prosecution's use of peremptory challenges in the
defendant's own petit jury selection. The scope of the holding is as yet
undertermined in numerous areas, and whether the spirit of the Batson
171. Id.
172. Id. at 330, 357 S.E.2d at 796.
173. Id. at 327 357 S.E.2d at 795.
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decision will extend outside the specific fact situation of Batson is uncer-
tain. Eventually the Supreme Court will have to confront some of these
areas as it reviews the implementation of the Batson decision by lower
courts. Until then, the area is ripe for litigation, and inconsistency will
likely continue to reign.
Barbara Isabel Campbell
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